The Global Nuclear Posture
We detail the threats, the policies and the possible solutions in a lively podcast on Deep State Radio
Last week, I had the chance to talk with my good friend, Jon Wolfsthal, on his Deep State Radio Network podcast, We’re All Going to Die. Below, I share the highlights of our discussion.
I met Jon when I was directing the nuclear policy program at the Stimson Center. When I became director of the Carnegie Endowment program on nuclear proliferation, I brought Jon on as our deputy director. We had a great five and a half years together, writing books, running the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Conference and strategizing with global leaders on the best ways to reduce nuclear dangers.
Jon went on to become the arms control advisor for Vice-President Joe Biden, then the Special Assistant to President Barack Obama for National Security Affairs and the senior director at the National Security Council for arms control and nonproliferation. He now serves on the International Security Advisory Board at the Department of State and as the Director of Global Risk at the Federation of American Scientists. Here is our discussion, edited and shortened for clarity.
Deep State Radio interview, Sept. 13
JOE: There are several aspects of the problem that we have to look at.
First, we are at an extinction-level event for the arms control regime that we have known for 60 years or more. These are the nuclear guard rails that have prevented the arsenals from growing out of control; that have brought us back from the nuclear brink; that reduced the arsenals from the absurd heights of the Cold War.
These restraint mechanisms are slowly collapsing — and some people are intentionally taking them apart, particularly Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. Putin no longer sees it in Russia’s interest to have these kinds of agreements. Here, the far right sees them as restraining the United States, not protecting it. I don't see much that can actually save the regime at this point. I'm quite pessimistic about its future.
At the same time, the United States and the other nuclear powers are modernizing their nuclear arsenals. Each of the nine nuclear-weapon states is building new nuclear weapons. Some are adding new nuclear capabilities, some, like China, are expanding their arsenals.
Over the last 15 years, we had a vigorous debate about what direction U.S. nuclear policy should take. You, Jon, were in the Obama administration when that administration championed a vision of the abolition of nuclear weapon, their complete elimination. The strategy was to get rid of them in a joint, careful, step-by-step, negotiated path to reduce and eventually eliminate them.
We lost that argument. That is no longer the active policy of the United States government. Technically, the position ever since Harry Truman has been that we want to eliminate nuclear weapons, but just because we say something doesn’t mean we actually mean it.
We also lost something else. As the price for getting the Senate to approve the New Start Treaty, Obama agreed to the modest modernization of existing nuclear forces. As long as you have nuclear forces, they have to be safe, secure and effective. So we must spend money to keep them working. Well, that $88 billion program under Obama grew to a $2 trillion program under Donald Trump and Joe Biden. We are replacing every single bomb. missile, submarine and warhead.
We lost the modernization debate. There is now in Washington a bipartisan consensus: The plan will now cost $2 trillion? Fine. Go ahead. Let's do it.
We have entered a new phase, however. What I would call Modernization Phase 2. Now, people are pushing not just to modernize the force, but to expand it, to develop newer nuclear weapons with new missions, new roles and spend a whole lot more money on it.
All these trends are coming together now. If Kamala Harris wins the election, as I think she will, she will face some very tough choices. I don't think the arms control community (what is left of it) is prepared for this. Nor are the people in the incoming Harris administration.
Now, the Harris campaign has a lot to think about, including the various crises in our country and in the world and, of course, about getting elected. But we have got to start planning for this. It has to start with us, with the listeners and makers of this podcast, with those of us in the progressive policy community. We must start start talking about it, laying out the decision trees, charting the paths that can be taken.
A President Harris can do a lot over over four years to change the trajectory. If we don’t, if she doesn't, we're looking at a world with no nuclear guard rails, with far more nuclear weapons, and with increased conflict and confrontation with all the accompanying dire nuclear risks. That is a world we shouldn’t have to live in.
JON: Now you know why Joe has been invited on We're All Going to Die radio. I think you sum up pretty nicely that the United States appears to be all in on the arms race.
It is interesting when I talk with with people on both sides, including those who advocate for further expansion — or Modernization 2.0, as you just put it — and I asked them a couple questions. One is: Okay, you want to build more submarines than are currently planned, you want to build a new sea-launched cruise missile, you want to build more tactical nuclear weapons — if we do all these things, do you think we're in a better position with Russia or China? Are we in a better position to convince them to stop challenging us?
The general answer I get is “No.” That it is not designed to convince them to stop. It’s designed to deter them and to prevent the failure of deterrence. At every step on the ladder of escalation, we will have some tool and it will give them pause. This is a fundamental disagreement between those who want more and those who think we have enough.
Here’s the thing: I think they already are pausing. I don't think China or Russia are prepared to start a nuclear war with the United States. I think we have plenty of nuclear capability. We may have to make some adjustments in terms of operations, depending on what Russia and China have and what the President says we need to do, but that somehow will get all these things and that will then lead to a stable environment, I think is just foolish and I think that's one of the differences.
The second question I ask them is how do you think we're gonna do this? Where do you think we're gonna get the money, when we can't do what we've already decided to do? We had a podcast recently on the Sentinel program [the new ICBM]. It went from $90 billion to a $160 billion — ninety percent over budget. It's years behind schedule.
This is part of the larger problem we have warned about. I think you funded Jeffrey Lewis and me at the time, Joe [when you were president of Ploughshares Fund]. We wrote a report at the Monterey Institute back in 2014 called The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad. We said that the United States will have to disarm by default because we're loading up too much and the industrial base can't handle it and we're gonna end up losing capability even though we say we want capability unless we stagger these programs.
As Jeff and I say all the time, “We hate being right.” We warned you. So, I think this is real challenge. Even if you think we need to maintain a certain nuclear capability, these plans are already compromising our ability to build the conventional capabilities that everyone agrees we need. That we are going to do more, faster and expand that, it doesn’t make a whole lot of sense to me
JOE: Let me build on that. It’s often important to start with one element that people can understand, then unfold the problem from there. You were prescient in that report, The Trillion Dollar Triad. At the time, the proponents of more nuclear weapons said, “No, no, no. It's not gonna cost that much.” You know how this game is played. All the contractors come in and they lowball it. “Don't worry, we can do this.” The Sentinel ICBM is a great example. The first estimate was $64 billion. People thought: “We’re gonna get 450 nuclear missiles for $64 billion? Great deal.” Now, we’re looking at $160 Billion, $180 billion. It is way behind schedule. And the projections are that costs will continue to rise.
Our colleague Geoffrey Wilson at The Stimson Center says that it is the most expensive nuclear missile in the world. It may become unaffordable. They're realizing they're going to have to build brand new missile silos, which presents a whole new problem and new costs because of all the land issues involved with those North Dakota and Montana farmers. They’re using their farmland for something and aren’t going to sell it cheap.
So, there’s now talk of shifting from fixed land deployment to road mobile deployments. We explored and rejected that in the Reagan administration — when you were in high school and I was on the House Armed Services Committee staff. It was a crazy idea then and now. But this is the desperation of where they're going. They claim it will be cheaper. But it won’t be.
It's getting to the point that we might not be able to afford this — even in a Washington with the insatiable desire of Congress to spend as much money as humanly possible on nuclear weapons. We just won't be able to do it.
This is just one element of Modernization Phase 2. This whole thing ripples out. Overall, we are now spending $70 billion a year on nuclear weapons. plus $30 billion a year on missile defense. So, $100 billion total, and it's going to grow.
Over the next decade nuclear weapons will consume more and more money. If you are Kamala Harris and you want to have a policy for the middle class, if you want to be expanding the opportunity economy, if you want to give people the things they truly need, like childcare and parental leave and reproductive rights, something has to give. You have to get that money from somewhere and tax increases will get you only so far. You can't afford to spend this kind of money on nuclear weapons that we simply don't need.
So, this will be a real decision point for the Harris administration. From what I know of the Democrats, few people really want to confront this. No one wants to look weak on defense. But it is a real economic problem. We are gonna have to wrestle with this sooner or later.
END OF PART ONE.
As an interested member of the public, when I read discussions like this I see....
I see people of good intentions. I see intelligent, well educated and informed people making a good faith effort to address the threat.
I see the experts earnestly engaged in the same kind of thinking and activity which has consistently failed to meet the challenge presented by nuclear weapons for 75 years. And I see no credible evidence that this pattern of behavior will ever succeed.
As a thought experiment, imagine that you're in your garage trying to repair your car. You have a plan which you proceed to implement. The plan doesn't work, so you try again. And again. And again. But still it's not working. Hmm...
At some point the most constructive thing you can do is to stand back, and admit that your original plan isn't working. You don't know what will work, but now that you've abandoned your original plan at least your mind is now open to other possibilities.
I want to read articles from experts that saying something like this. "Nothing we've ever said or done is working, and we don't have a clue what to do next." I want to read that article, because that's what the truth is.
The problem here is that nuclear weapons experts can't speak this truth, because to do so would threaten the nuclear weapons experts business. And like everyone else, nuclear weapons experts very reasonably prioritize their family's future over the state of the world. Anyone would do that. Everyone should do that.
And so we are stuck. The only people the public (and thus the politicians) will listen to are the experts. And the experts can't say what needs to be said. And so we go round and round to nowhere on the hamster wheel of failure as humanity drifts towards the abyss.
I don't know what the solution is either, but I suspect it lies somewhere in this direction.
Awhile back I read about an open letter signed by 1,000 scientists expressing their alarm about nuclear weapons. That sounds good at first, until you realize that such letters are really just a mechanism for the scientists to let themselves off the hook from taking inconvenient action that might actually make a difference, for example, 1,000 scientists going out on strike.
The brain dead nuclear weapons denial disease status quo is not going to surrender to articles, books, speeches, conferences, information, reasoned analysis or any other products of the nuclear weapons experts industry.
Some form of effective leverage will need to be applied. And I predict that won't happen until after the next detonation. At that point anything could happen, for both the better and the worse.
While we await that turning point, we can explore another option which is currently engaging my interest. What if our assumption that global nuclear war is the worst thing that could ever happen is wrong? What if our assumption that life is better than death is wrong? Given the path we're currently on, such questions seem worth considering. If interested, try this as a place to get started:
https://www.youtube.com/@cominghomechannel
2 trillion. For starters. Follow where that money goes, and you see who is writing policy for government to implement.