Joe- As I digest the first part of your treatise, it brought to mind the words of a former President:
A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction. . . . American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. . . . This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. . . .Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. . . . In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. Dwight D. Eisenhower
Witness the influence that has taken over policy decisions. We've allowed the fox into the henhouse. As I watch Elon Musk dictating policy from a perch that needs no confirmation, it should trouble all of us. He and his entities are up to their ears in government defense and he is about to be put in charge of spending. What can go wrong here?
Here's one attempt to understand the failure pattern Joe refers to above. A theory...
As paid professionals, the nuclear weapons expert community is engaged in a business. Like all intellectual careers, this business runs on reputation. Nuclear weapons experts see their target audience as being nuclear weapons policy makers. Talking up the chain of command like this enhances the reputation of the experts, and is thus good for business.
High ranking people in various arms of the government have the prestige nuclear weapons experts seek to be associated with. But the bottom line is that such prominent people are not the real decision makers. Who is then?
Ask yourself this. Why in the recent presidential election were nuclear weapons, the single biggest threat to the survival of the nation, only barely mentioned? The politicians of both parties know that their boss, the voters, aren't interested in this topic. And so, the politicians of both parties do what they are supposed to do in a democracy, they represent the will of the people, and ignore nuclear weapons.
What if the nuclear weapons expert community is failing in it's stated mission because they are talking to the wrong people?
Sure, on the surface it sounds logical that the experts should be aiming their attention at policy makers. However, unless the public is successfully engaged on this topic, the policy makers are basically powerless to implement any real change. Without the public behind them, the most the policy makers can hope to accomplish is to fiddle around with the status quo a bit, and then try to brand that fiddling as a big success.
As example, the dramatic reduction of the number of nuclear weapons is repeatedly offered as an example of success, except that this reduction didn't make Americans safer, it only made the nuclear arms stockpiles more affordable. It was a budget success, not a public safety success.
At the heart of the failure of the nuclear weapons community may be a conflict between business interests and policy interests. It's in the business interests of nuclear weapons experts to aim their focus at prominent people.
But it's not prominent people who will in the end make any big decisions about nuclear weapons. In a democracy, big decisions are in the end made by the people, and then those decisions are articulated and implemented by those the people elect to high office.
A solution?
What if a cadre of nuclear weapons experts were essentially given tenure by Congress. A life time appointment and appropriate salary, which could not be revoked. Like the Supreme Court for example. As a condition of appointment, this cadre of experts would not be permitted to earn income from any other source.
This group of experts would no longer need to worry about reputation and business agendas, and could instead focus on the job the needs to be done, engaging the public.
The experts will say that they are already doing this through their books, blogs and public speeches etc. But that's talking AT the public. And not talking WITH the public.
And in any sphere of life, when we're not willing to talk WITH somebody, their response is usually to ignore us.
That's what I see happening. The nuclear weapons expert community is ignoring the public, and being ignored in return.
Joe writes, "The reasons are threefold: lack of funding, lack of public support, and the failure of the organizations to sustain a change in nuclear policy."
Imho, this is really one reason. Near universal nuclear weapons denial.
The shortage of funding and absence of political will is a result of a lack of public support, resulting in a failure to change nuclear policy.
Nuclear weapons denial seems to arise from a very human inability to truly grasp very large existential issues in the abstract. We need to see it to believe it.
The message of the nuclear weapons community couldn't be more important. But the medium in which that message is being delivered, reason and facts, isn't well suited to the task at hand. Trump's election seems proof that vast numbers of the American public are simply not able to successfully process reason and facts.
Phil- The comparisons to the Nazis are facile but accurate. Goebbels was a master of language and he instinctively knew that creating fear and making them fearful of the 'enemy' (Jews) gave him incredible power. The Nazis were masters of the message...and we saw the results.
Facts and reason have no bearing on that kind of messaging. Whether the GOP was chanelling the Nazis begs the question: their messaging did. They successfully created fear amongst the population (of the hordes of immigrants) and managed to convince enough people that a galloping economy was not good. There are the large existential issues that were not grasped.
To think that the same people can grasp the enormity of nuclear weapons is a dream. Few, if any people, are alive to remember the devastation of Hiroshima or Nagasaki. The same is true of climate change...if you can't see it, it doesn't exist.
It's easy for us to sit at our desks and contemplate these issues. But what then? How do responsible people turn the tide to reason? It was so disheartening to realize that nearly half of my fellow Americans bought into a snake oil salesman's lies. It's very discouraging.
Liz Warner writes, "At the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons stockpiles were quickly declining after a high point of 70,000 nuclear warheads…This was the result of treaties that greatly reduced global nuclear arsenals…This new trend showed the promise of a new day."
My understanding, which welcomes a challenge, was that this decline in nuclear weapons stockpiles, while impressive, was never intended to make the world safer. It's purpose was instead to make the nuclear weapons programs of the great powers more affordable. Seen through the much more limited lens of saving money, the treaties can be labeled a success.
As we've discussed before, what difference does it really make if Russia has 1,000 nukes, or 100,000 nukes? In the event of a war, the end result would be pretty much the same. 50 nukes could collapse America's largest cities. A handful of nukes targeted at our ports would probably quickly collapse the economy, resulting in social and political chaos.
That said, I am certainly not an expert, and would welcome contrasting points of view on these matters.
Joe writes, " It is difficult to find any American arms control organization that is growing. Most are small and contracting."
A quick note: A few years ago I made a determined effort to become part of the nuclear arms community. What I discovered was this. Experts and activists want to talk AT the public, not WITH the public. In fairness, this pattern is pretty common across many fields. This pattern may in some small part explain why some arms control projects are small and contracting. For those of us in the public, there's not really much for us to be a part of.
Joe- As I digest the first part of your treatise, it brought to mind the words of a former President:
A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction. . . . American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. . . . This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. . . .Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. . . . In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. Dwight D. Eisenhower
Witness the influence that has taken over policy decisions. We've allowed the fox into the henhouse. As I watch Elon Musk dictating policy from a perch that needs no confirmation, it should trouble all of us. He and his entities are up to their ears in government defense and he is about to be put in charge of spending. What can go wrong here?
Tom
Here's one attempt to understand the failure pattern Joe refers to above. A theory...
As paid professionals, the nuclear weapons expert community is engaged in a business. Like all intellectual careers, this business runs on reputation. Nuclear weapons experts see their target audience as being nuclear weapons policy makers. Talking up the chain of command like this enhances the reputation of the experts, and is thus good for business.
High ranking people in various arms of the government have the prestige nuclear weapons experts seek to be associated with. But the bottom line is that such prominent people are not the real decision makers. Who is then?
Ask yourself this. Why in the recent presidential election were nuclear weapons, the single biggest threat to the survival of the nation, only barely mentioned? The politicians of both parties know that their boss, the voters, aren't interested in this topic. And so, the politicians of both parties do what they are supposed to do in a democracy, they represent the will of the people, and ignore nuclear weapons.
What if the nuclear weapons expert community is failing in it's stated mission because they are talking to the wrong people?
Sure, on the surface it sounds logical that the experts should be aiming their attention at policy makers. However, unless the public is successfully engaged on this topic, the policy makers are basically powerless to implement any real change. Without the public behind them, the most the policy makers can hope to accomplish is to fiddle around with the status quo a bit, and then try to brand that fiddling as a big success.
As example, the dramatic reduction of the number of nuclear weapons is repeatedly offered as an example of success, except that this reduction didn't make Americans safer, it only made the nuclear arms stockpiles more affordable. It was a budget success, not a public safety success.
At the heart of the failure of the nuclear weapons community may be a conflict between business interests and policy interests. It's in the business interests of nuclear weapons experts to aim their focus at prominent people.
But it's not prominent people who will in the end make any big decisions about nuclear weapons. In a democracy, big decisions are in the end made by the people, and then those decisions are articulated and implemented by those the people elect to high office.
A solution?
What if a cadre of nuclear weapons experts were essentially given tenure by Congress. A life time appointment and appropriate salary, which could not be revoked. Like the Supreme Court for example. As a condition of appointment, this cadre of experts would not be permitted to earn income from any other source.
This group of experts would no longer need to worry about reputation and business agendas, and could instead focus on the job the needs to be done, engaging the public.
The experts will say that they are already doing this through their books, blogs and public speeches etc. But that's talking AT the public. And not talking WITH the public.
And in any sphere of life, when we're not willing to talk WITH somebody, their response is usually to ignore us.
That's what I see happening. The nuclear weapons expert community is ignoring the public, and being ignored in return.
Joe writes, "The reasons are threefold: lack of funding, lack of public support, and the failure of the organizations to sustain a change in nuclear policy."
Imho, this is really one reason. Near universal nuclear weapons denial.
The shortage of funding and absence of political will is a result of a lack of public support, resulting in a failure to change nuclear policy.
Nuclear weapons denial seems to arise from a very human inability to truly grasp very large existential issues in the abstract. We need to see it to believe it.
The message of the nuclear weapons community couldn't be more important. But the medium in which that message is being delivered, reason and facts, isn't well suited to the task at hand. Trump's election seems proof that vast numbers of the American public are simply not able to successfully process reason and facts.
Phil- The comparisons to the Nazis are facile but accurate. Goebbels was a master of language and he instinctively knew that creating fear and making them fearful of the 'enemy' (Jews) gave him incredible power. The Nazis were masters of the message...and we saw the results.
Facts and reason have no bearing on that kind of messaging. Whether the GOP was chanelling the Nazis begs the question: their messaging did. They successfully created fear amongst the population (of the hordes of immigrants) and managed to convince enough people that a galloping economy was not good. There are the large existential issues that were not grasped.
To think that the same people can grasp the enormity of nuclear weapons is a dream. Few, if any people, are alive to remember the devastation of Hiroshima or Nagasaki. The same is true of climate change...if you can't see it, it doesn't exist.
It's easy for us to sit at our desks and contemplate these issues. But what then? How do responsible people turn the tide to reason? It was so disheartening to realize that nearly half of my fellow Americans bought into a snake oil salesman's lies. It's very discouraging.
Tom
Real world events may teach us what reason can not. That's the best hope I can offer at the moment.
The ideal real world event would be a nuclear weapons accident, because the damage, while horrific, would be limited. And it wouldn't lead to a war.
Where such an accident happened would also seem to matter, because media coverage of the event would be far greater in some places than in others.
More films like The Day After would probably help at the margins.
Liz Warner writes, "At the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons stockpiles were quickly declining after a high point of 70,000 nuclear warheads…This was the result of treaties that greatly reduced global nuclear arsenals…This new trend showed the promise of a new day."
My understanding, which welcomes a challenge, was that this decline in nuclear weapons stockpiles, while impressive, was never intended to make the world safer. It's purpose was instead to make the nuclear weapons programs of the great powers more affordable. Seen through the much more limited lens of saving money, the treaties can be labeled a success.
As we've discussed before, what difference does it really make if Russia has 1,000 nukes, or 100,000 nukes? In the event of a war, the end result would be pretty much the same. 50 nukes could collapse America's largest cities. A handful of nukes targeted at our ports would probably quickly collapse the economy, resulting in social and political chaos.
That said, I am certainly not an expert, and would welcome contrasting points of view on these matters.
Joe writes, " It is difficult to find any American arms control organization that is growing. Most are small and contracting."
A quick note: A few years ago I made a determined effort to become part of the nuclear arms community. What I discovered was this. Experts and activists want to talk AT the public, not WITH the public. In fairness, this pattern is pretty common across many fields. This pattern may in some small part explain why some arms control projects are small and contracting. For those of us in the public, there's not really much for us to be a part of.